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AIRCRAFT NOISE: A TAKING OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST
COMPENSATION
PEARCE W. FiEmm *
Little did Orville and Wilbur Wright realize when they made
their 1903 flight at Kitty Hawk that they were not only making
history with their airplane but were also adding another dimen-
sion to the ever increasing problem of the use of airspace above
one's property. The problem, commonly referred to today as one
of aircraft noise, entered its latest stage in 1958 with the intro-
duction of the jetliner into widespread commercial use. The next
stage is fast approaching with the development of a supersonic
transport for commercial use.
No one will doubt that the introduction of flight into our
society has caused rapid and radical changes in the modern
world, from concepts of distance, time and speed, to advanced
methods of warfare. Particular attention is called to its impact
on the traditional legal concepts governing the use of airspace
with emphasis being placed on the Roman law maxim oujus est
soum, ejus esque ad eoelum.' The rapid development in this cen-
tury of the air age necessarily has brought about the eradication
of the traditional concept that ownership of real property in-
cludes control of the airspace above it to the ultimate limits of
the sky. If there had been any doubt that the place of the ad
coelurn2 doctrine today is in the archives of legal history, this
should have been put to rest finally by the Supreme Court case
of United States v. Causby3 in which Mr. Justice Douglas stated
that the doctrine has no place in the modern world and that
Congress in effect has declared the air to be a public highway.
If the law was otherwise, he reasoned, then "every transconti-
nental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass
suits."
'4
* J.A. 1966, University of South Carolina School of Law; associate, Powell
and Kligman, Columbia, S. C.
1. "He who owns the land owns the airspace above it to the heavens."
BLACK, LA-W DIcTIoNARY 453 (4th ed. 1957).
2. Ibid.
3. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
4 Id. at 261. Mr. Justice Douglas went further in Causby to say that "to
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog their highways, se-
riously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and
transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim."
Id. at 261.
1
Fleming: Aircraft Noise: A Taking of Private Property Without Just Compens
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLiwA LAw REvmw
The erosion of the ad coelim doctrine is not something new to
this century. Its decline was observed as early as 1815 by Lord
Ellenborough:
But I am by no means prepared to say that firing across a
field in 'vauo, no part of the contents touching it, amounts
to a cZausum fregit. Nay, if this board overhanging the
plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow then an
aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass quare causum
fregit at the suit of the occupier of every field over which
his balloon passes in the course of his voyage.5
On the other hand, Sir Frederick Pollock was of the opinion that
an entry above an occupier's land would constitute a trespass
even where the entry was made without touching the property
"unless indeed it can be said that the scope of the possible tres-
pass is limited to that of possible effective possession, which
might be the most reasonable rule."6 Two years before the land-
mark Gausly case the Supreme Court decided Northwest Airlines
v. Minnesota,7 where in a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Jackson
stated that "aviation has added a new dimension to travel and
to our ideas. The ancient idea that landlordism and sovereignty
extend from the center of the world to the periphery of the uni-
verse has been modified."8
The magnitude of the problem of aircraft noise, particularly
since the introduction of commercial jetliners, is not only one
of national concern but also of international significance. Of
particular note in this area are two European developments.
Recently the British government has instituted what it calls
"Operation Shoo," whereby the government has agreed to pay
one-half of the cost of soundproofing three rooms of each af-
fected house. This project has been instituted on a trial basis and
is restricted to the residential area immediately surrounding the
London airport. Also, recent developments in France illustrate
the perils that face the airlines there. A builder in Nice, France,
5. Pickering v. Rudd, 4 Camp. 219, 220-21, 171 Eng. Rep. 70, 71-72 (N.P.
1815).
6. PoLLOcx, ToRTs 362 (13th ed. 1929).
7. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
8. Id. at 302-03. Mr. Justice Jackson added that "today the landowner no
more possesses a vertical control of all the air above him than a shore owner
possesses a horizontal control of all the sea before him. The air is too precious
as an open highway to permit it to be 'owned' to the exclusion or embarrass-
ment of air navigation by surface landlords who could put it to little real use."
Id. at 303.
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assumed a deliberate risk by placing an apartment building
within eighty yards of the airport runway. Subsequently, the
builder found that the aircraft noise from more than fifty jets
a day at the Nice Airport discouraged prospective tenants and
sued Air France, the major contributor to the noise. The airline
argued that it was not the correct defendant and that the Nice
Chamber of Commerce, the airport operator, should be sued.
To the consternation of the government-controlled airline, the
French court awarded four hundred thousand dollars in dam-
ages to the builder.9
In 1926 Congress enacted the Air Commerce Act,10 which de-
fined the phrase "navigable air.%pace" to mean airspace above the
minimum safe altitudes of flight set by the Secretary of Com-
merce and established the minimum navigable airspace at one
thousand feet over congested areas, including cities and towns,
and five hundred feet elsewhere."1 The Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 replaced the 1926 act, and this was followed by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958. The 1938 amendment was designed to cover
all air commerce.' 2 The courts construed "air commerce" to in-
clude purely intra-state flights on the theory that such flights
penetrate federal airspace or endanger interstate flights.18 The
major importance of the 1958 act was to broaden the definition
of the term "navigable airspace" to include "airspace needed to
insure safety in takeoff and landing of aircraft. ' 1
4
With this as a background it is appropriate to examine some
of the legal problems created by this rapidly advancing air age.
A. LegaZ Theories of Landowner ReZief
While there are several approaches that the landowner can and
has used to protect his property rights, two of the most commonly
used have been trespass and nuisance. The older approach re-
volved around nuisance but this provides only injunctive relief,
which has become impractical in view of the need for develop-
9. See Time, p. 67 (March 18, 1966).
10. 44 Stat 568, 574 (1926), as amended, 52 Stat. 1028 (1938), now Federal
Aviation Act § 1(3), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1958).
11. See Federal Air Regulations § 91.79, 28 F.R. 6702 (1963) for current
regulations.
12. Civil Aeronautics Act § 1(3), 52 Stat. 977 (1938), now Federal Aviation
Act § 1(3), 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (1958).
13. E.g., Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F2d 932 (10th Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 318 U.S. 790 (1943).
14. Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1958).
1966]
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ment of a modern air transportation system.15 The landowner's
rights in a trespass action are spoken of in terms of possession,
occupancy and control, 16 and this approach has not proved very
successful especially when coupled with the restrictive test of
reasonable use and enjoyment of the land. Therefore, the Restate-
ment of Torts has moved toward a more fluid approach using
many of the concepts found in nuisance actions.17 A movement
toward the nuisance theory, combining the elements of nuisance
with remedies available at law, would be an improvement be-
cause the court could find an interference with one's land without
the actual physical invasion normally required under a trespass
theory. Furthermore and probably of more direct importance,
the nuisance theory seems to more nearly parallel the balancing
of interest test whereby the court weighs the relative interests of
the public and private individuals.
Some courts have gone so far as to completely reject the theory
of trespass. The Oregon Supreme Court has determined that
"whenever the aid of equity is sought to enjoin all or part of the
operations of a private airport, including flights over the land
of the plaintiff, the suit is for the abatement of a nuisance, and
the law of nuisance rather than that of trespass applies."' The
court went further to say that "the Restatement rule which at-
tempts to pour new wine into the old bottle of trespass appears
to be losing adherents, and does not commend itself to this
court .... -"1 As a capstone to its approval of the nuisance ap-
proach, the Oregon court stated that "reasonableness is so in-
herent in the judicial balancing of interest in the airport cases
that most of the decisions . . . simply proceed to investigate the
facts and then grant or deny relief upon the basis of the reason-
ableness of one interest yielding to another in a given case." 20
The balancing of interest test is used, and the vehicle employed
is the nuisance concept with only a passing gesture being directed
toward the law of trespass.
21
15. E.g., Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575
(1942) (dictum).
16. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 157-58 (1934).
17. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Explanatory Note § 194 at 36-38 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1958).
18. Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 223 Ore. 624, 633, 355 P.2d 229, 233 (1960).
19. Ibid.
20. Id. at 632, 355 P.2d at 232.
21. It should be noted that the 1958 Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 739, 49
U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1958), created a privilege for low level flights, and it has
been suggested that this privilege effectively bars injunctive relief. See Hill,
Liability for Aircraft Noise-The Aftermath of Cauiby and Griggs, 19 U.
MrAmi L. REv. 1, 8 (1964).
[Vol. 18
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In actions against the federal government landowners who
suffer injury from overflights have had to rely on the basic con-
stitutional law theories providing for compensation under the
power of eminent domain.22 One of the problems in this area is
that tort actions on the theories of trespass and/or nuisance, the
traditional grounds for recovery from private individuals, 23 are
not available against a governmental body. The barriers here are
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Tucker Act.24 Fur-
ther, the Federal Tort Claims Act offers no remedy for the non-
negligent or discretionary acts of federal employees. 25 Under the
constitutional approach the landowner must first establish that
there has been a "taking." This requires examination of the fifth
amendment and its application to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. 26 Under these constitutional provisions the
courts have traditionally required a physical invasion of the
property before they can find a constitutional taking.27 Fortu-
nately, there appears to be more flexibility in determining com-
pensation in air easements.28 A point of saving grace is that even
if the federal courts follow the strict trespass theory, as evidenced
by Batten v. United States,29 the distraught property owner
might very well have an action in a state court on a theory of
nuisance which would not require a direct overflight.30 Many
state constitutions have broader language permitting a wider
coverage than the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution.31
The final problem in this area is that most of the cases mix
the elements of trespass and nuisance in attempting to determine
whether there has been an interference with the use of land by
22. See 24 U. Prrr. L. REv. 603, 606 (1963); 63 CoL m. L. REy. 755, 756
(1963).
23. PRossEa, ToRTs §§ 13-14, 70-74 (2d ed. 1955).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1958).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) ; Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15 (1953).
26. Chicago, B.&Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
27. See, e.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
28. Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1581, 1582-85 (1961).
29. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
30. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1958).
31. See 2 NIcHoLS, EmINENT DoMAiN § 6.44 (3d ed. 1963, Cune. Supp.
1966). Twenty-six states are listed as having constitutional provisions that
private property should neither be taken for public use nor damaged without
just compensation. South Carolina is not within this group. The South Caro-
lina Constitution only provides that "property shall not be taken for private
use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just com-
pensation being first made therefor." S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 17.
19661
5
Fleming: Aircraft Noise: A Taking of Private Property Without Just Compens
Published by Scholar Commons,
SouTrx CAtOLIwA LAW RuvWiw
low-flying aircraft sufficient to constitute a taking. 2 This mix-
ture of theories results in confusion when trying to decide which
route to follow.
B. The Approach Under the FederaZ Cases
The approach to the problem by the federal law finds its birth
in the concept of a constitutional taking of a proprietary interest
in land by inverse condemnation caused by frequent flights at
low levels over private property.33 The landmark case in this
area is the 1946 Supreme Court decision of Causby v. United
States. 4 The original action was instituted in the Court of
Claims under the Tucker Act35 in an attempt to recover just com-
pensation for the alleged taking of an interest in a home and
chicken farm. This property was located in the airport approach
zone approximately 2,200 feet from the end of the main runway.
The federal government leased the airport, and there were fre-
quent low level flights by military aircraft over the land in ques-
tion. The alleged result was destruction of the use of the prop-
erty as a chicken farm combined with the loss of sleep, nervous-
ness and fright on the part of the petitioning party. The holding
of the Court of Claims was to the effect that over-flights in this
particular case constituted a "taking" of an easement of flight
for which the petitioner was entitled to just and reasonable com-
pensation.a0 Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a majority of the
Court, noted that the landowner has a claim to the airspace as an
incident of his ownership, and ihvasions of it are in the same
category as invasions of the surface.37 He further concluded that
"flights over private land are not a taking unless they are so low
32. See Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) ; United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Batten v. United States, 306 F2d 580, 585-87
(10th Cir. 1962) (dissent); Note, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1581, 1583-85 (1961).
33. Inverse condemnation is a phrase used to describe a cause of action
against a government defendant to recover the value of property which has
been taken in fact by the government defendant without the normal formal
procedure of eminent domain. See Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore.
178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
34. 328 U.S. 256 (1946). (The Causby case was decided on May 27, 1946.
The Federal Tort Claims Act did not become law until August 2, 1946.)
35. 24 Stat. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1941). This act states that "the
Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded upon the Constitution or founded upon any
express or implied contract with the United States." In 1946 when the Causby
case was decided, the pertinent statute was 36 Stat 1136, 28 U.S.C. § 250(1)
(1940) in which the language was almost identical to that stated above.
36. 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct C1. 1945).
37. Causby v United States, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
[Vol. 18
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and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment and use of the land.""" The standard established
under Causby was that "the landowner, as an incident of his
ownership, has a claim to [airspace] and that invasions of it are
in the same category as invasions of the surface."319 The Supreme
Court held there had been a taking in this situation.40 One of
the unfortunate results of this decision was that the Court spoke
in terms of both a trespass and a nuisance which created con-
fusion in determining the underlying theory of the case. Since
both Causby and Griggs v. County of Allegheny41 involved di-
rect overflights at tree-top level, it has been suggested that both
decisions could be supported exclusively on trespass theories. 42
Batten v. United States43 illustrates the unfortunate interpre-
tation that the lower federal courts are giving to the Causby
decision. This case also was an action by the property owners for
a taking of property. There was, however, "no physical invasion"l
of the affected property by the operation and maintenance of the
military jet aircraft which produced the noise, vibration and
smoke of which the landowner complained. This action was main-
tained under the Tucker Act,4 4 and the Tenth Circuit, citing
Causby, rested its decision on the need for a direct overflight. 45
The court noted that ear plugs are recommended for Air Force
personnel when the sound pressure level reaches eighty-five
decibels and ear plugs are required at or above ninety-five deci-
bels.46 On the plaintiff's property the noise level varied from
ninety to one hundred seventeen decibels. Further, the diminu-
tion in value of homes ran from a high of 55.3 per cent to a low
of 40.8 per cent. As if to pour salt in the plaintiff's wounds, the
court recognized that disturbances to property owners may be
just as great to those living outside the traffic patterns as to
those suffering the burden of a direct overflight, but no amount
of sympathy for the plaintiff's plight could change the nature of
their claim which was neither trespass nor nuisance. 47 The often
38. Id. at 266.
39. Id. at 265.
40. Id. at 268.
41. 369 U.S. 84 (1962). See infra, note 64 and accompanying text.
42. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 181, 376 P.2d 100, 103
(1962).
43. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
44. 24 Stat. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2).
45. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1962).
46. Id. at 582.
47. Id. at 583.
1966]
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quoted phrase from United States v. Willow River Power Co., 48
that "damage alone gives courts no power to require compensa-
tion1" 4O was relied on, as was the distinction between consequen-
tial damages and a taking." The majority also cited an earlier
case which stated that in an action by the government not
amounting to an occupancy, there would be a taking "if its ef-
fects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of
his interest in the subject matter .. ."51 The court's quick an-
swer to this was that there had been no deprivation of "all or
most" of the plaintiff's interest.52 Finally in what appears to be
an indication of disapproval of their decision, a majority of the
court stated that any solution must come through legislative
action, and no recovery is available through the Constitution
alone.""
The dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Murrah in Batten ap-
pears to be the more logical and just approach to the problem.
He did not feel that Causby and Griggs turned solely on the
trespass theory.54 He stated that "a constitutional taking does
not necessarily depend on whether the Government physically
invaded the property damaged";5 rather the government may
accomplish by indirect interference the equivalent of an outright
physical invasion. 6 Judge Murrah proposed the following con-
stitutional test:
[F]irst, whether the asserted interest is one which the law
will protect; if so, whether the interference is sufficiently
direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude to
cause us to conclude that fairness and justice, as between the
State and the citizen requires the burden imposed to be
borne by the public and not by the individual alone.57
The other major federal case is Griggs v. County of Alle-
gkeny 8 wherein the proposition advanced in Causby was reaf-
48. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
49. Id. at 510.
50. See Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879).
51. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
52. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962).
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at 587.
55. Id. at 586.
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at 587.
58. 369 U.S. 84 (1962)
[Vol. 18
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firmed, and the question of whom to sue was solved. Causby had
established that there was a cause of action and a remedy, but
it left open the question of where to place the liability. There
are three entities which possibly could be held liable: the owner
of the over-flying aircraft, the operator of the airport at which
the landing or taking off occurs, or the United States Govern-
ment which controls the paths and altitudes of aircraft. Fac-
tually, this case was similar to Causby, but here the defendant
was the county which designed and built the airport with the
assistance and approval of the federal government. As in Causby,
there were direct overflights by low-level aircraft using the ap-
proach zones to the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The Board of
Viewers determined that there was a taking by the county and
awarded damages to Griggs. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed, saying that "there had been no taking of the plaintiff's
property by the County of Allegheny. . . ."5 They added that
the aircraft which had made the flights over the plaintiff's land
should have been held liable.60 In practice it would be unfair,
and it would provide an inadequate remedy, to follow the theory
of the Pennsylvania court and require the subjacent landowner
to look to the over-flying aircraft for recovery. The landowner's
problem of obtaining the identity, type, size, altitude and sched-
ules of the commercial airlines would be further complicated by
the presence of military, private and non-scheduled flights."1
The Supreme Court refused to agree with the Pennsylvania
decision and speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, stated that:
[R]espondent, which was the promoter, owner and lessor of
the airport, was in these circumstances the one who took the
air easement in the constitutional sense. Respondent decided,
subject to the approval of the C.A.A., where the airport
would be built, what runways it would need, their direction,
and length,. and what land and navigation easements would
be needed. The Federal Government takes nothing; it is the
local authority which decides to build an airport veZ non,
and where it is located. We see no difference between its
responsibility for the air easements necessary for operation
59. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 402 Pa. 411, 415, 168 A2d 123, 127
(1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
60. Ibid.
61. See Note, 74 HAmv. L. REv. 1581, 1586-87 (1961) for a discussion of
this problem.
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of the airport and its responsibility for the land on which
the runways are built.
2
At the time this decision was rendered, the term "navigable air-
space" had been defined to include the airspace needed for take-
offs and landings.63 Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the majority
opinions in both the Causby and Griggs cases, noted this change
in the statute since the 1946 Causby opinion, but citing Causby,
he indicated that the presence of the Griggs aircraft within the
navigable airspace would not alter the result.64 Consequently,
the Griggs decision stands for the propositions that there is a
taking of private property even where planes are taking off or
landing within the navigable airspace and that the county or
operator of the airport is the correct party to sue.65
There have been two recent federal cases in South Carolina.6
In both cases the district court relied on Batten to hold that since
there had been no direct overflights, there was no taking within
the constitutional sense.
From the development of the federal case law in this area, it
is apparent that the basic problem under the present interpreta-
tion of Causby and Griggs is to determine what constitutes a
reasonable use and enjoyment of one's land. One theory advanced
is that of "possible effective possession" under which the owner
is thought to have a proprietary interest in as much of the air-
space above his land as he is able to occupy or use in the enjoy-
ment of his land irrespective of whether or not such land is
presently being used by the owner.67 Another approach is under
the theory of actual use, whereby the right encompasses that
amount of space above the ground that the landowner can occupy
and use while enjoying the use of his land.68 It is apparent that
under this theory the right of a landowner to the space above his
land is not fixed, and one circuit court has pointed out that "it
varies with our varying needs and is co-extensive with them. The
62. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962).
63. 72 Stat. 739, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24).
64. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 88 (1962).
65. Mr. Justices Black and Frankfurter dissented in Griggs. They said that
under Catesby there was a taking, but that the United States and not the county
of Allegheny had done the taking. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S.
84, 90 (1962).
66. Bellamy v. United States, 235 F. Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Leavell v.
United States, 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
67. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 523, 173 S.E. 817, 826 (1934).
68. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
[Vol. 18
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owner of land owns as much of the space above as he uses, but
only so long as he uses it. All that lies beyond belongs to the
world." 9 It would appear that the former theory permits the
landowner to use all the space above his land so long as he can
make effective use of it, while the latter theory permits the land-
owner to claim that amount of space above his land which he is
actually using, and he may claim that amount of space only so
long as he continues to make use of it.70
A great deal of litigation in the field of avigation easements
has revolved around the date of taking. The Tucker Act has a
statute of limitation period barring suits not begun within six
years after the cause of action arose. In the case of an avigation
easement, this period begins to run at the date of taking.7 1 Com-
mon law principles come into play here also, and if the plaintiff
purchased land after the avigation easement had been "taken,"
the title which the purchaser acquired would be subject to a
prescriptive easement.72 The introduction of the jet aircraft into
commercial service in mid-1958 brought on a new flood of cases,
as illustrated by Highland Park 'v. United States."" The United
States had operated propeller-driven aircraft at Hunter Air
Force Base without objections from landowners because these
craft did not seriously disturb the "use and enjoyment" of the
property.7 4 In December, 1953 the Air Force introduced the B-47
jet aircraft into service. The operation of this type of aircraft at
low altitudes did disturb the claimant's property and was held
to constitute a taking for which compensation should be al-
lowed.7 5 The court noted that the difficult question was setting
a just compensation,76 and in placing a value on the property to
establish amount of compensation, the "date of taking" was set
at December 31, 1953 when the jet aircraft were introduced at
the Hunter base.77 Finally, the court held that the defendant,
the United States, was "vested with a perpetual easement of
69. Id. at 758.
70. Another theory advanced is that the airspace is like navigable waters.
See Harvey, Landowners Right in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56
MicH. L. REv. 1313, 1318 (1958).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1948); United States v. Dicldnson, 331 U.S. 745
(1947).
72. Smithdeal v. American Airlines, 80 F. Supp. 233, 234 (N.D. Tex. 1948).
73. 142 Ct. Cl. 269 (1958).
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Id. at 274-75.
1966]
11
Fleming: Aircraft Noise: A Taking of Private Property Without Just Compens
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEW
flight over plaintiff's property at an elevation of one hundred
feet or more above the ground with airplanes of any character.' 
8
When again faced with the problem of "when did this inter-
ference become so serious that a taking occurred and a cause of
action arose,170 the Court of Claims attempted to lay down an
objective standard.
[T]here is, unfortunately, no simple litmus test for discov-
ering in all cases when an avigation easement is first taken
by overflights. Some annoyance must be borne without com-
pensation. The point when that stage is passed depends on
a particularized judgment evaluating such factors as the
frequency and level of the flights; the type of planes; the
accompanying effects, such as noise or falling objects; the
uses of the property; the effect on values; the reasonable
reactions of the humans below; and the impact upon animals
and vegetable life.80
One case, decided in 1958, indicated that the taking of an aviga-
tion easement over a tract of land at a certain elevation gave
the government the right to operate every type of aircraft in the
affected airspace.81 A more recent decision stands for the propo-
sition that even where the government has previously acquired
a perpetual easement for the flight of aircraft, the subsequent
introduction of heavier, noisier aircraft constitutes a new taking
even though the new aircraft do not violate the boundaries of the
initial easement.8 2 This would appear to be the most reasonable
approach to the problem.
Under the federal approach to the taking of avigation ease-
ments, the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution
provides for just compensation for a taking of, but not damages
to, private property.8 3 The federal government is not required
to pay for consequential damages in taking or acquiring an
interest in private property by direct action or by inverse con-
demnation. The controlling rule was established by Transporta-
tion Co. v. Chicago"4 to the effect that acts done in the lawful
78. Id. at 276.
79. Jensen v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 333, 338 (1962).
80. Ibid.
81. Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 143 Ct. Cl. 921 (1958).
82. Avery v. United States, 165 Ct. CL 357 (1964).
83. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just com-
pensation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
84. 99 U.S. 336 (1878).
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exercise of governmental authority may impair the use of prop-
erty with a corresponding fall in its value, but such acts do not
require just compensation unless there is an actual encroachment
or invasion of the property. Those damages experienced by the
individual, as opposed to those experienced by the public at large,
are the only damages for which the federal government may be
liable.8 5 Just compensation is paid to those property owners who
suffer damages different in kind, and not merely in degree, from
those which are "common to the public at large."
8 6
C. The Approach Under the State Cases
The point of primary importance in this area is that the illogi-
cal, and in many cases unjust, restriction found in the area of
recovery against the federal government is not necessarily car-
ried over into suits against municipal, county or state govern-
ments. The theory of trespass has not been blindly followed by
the state courts.8 7 Furthermore, several state constitutions in-
clude language allowing recovery for a "taking" as well as for
a "damaging."88 The South Carolina Constitution only specifies
"taking," but this has been held to include "damaging."8 9 The
court has declared that "a property owner is entitled under the
applicable constitutional provision to compensation for damaging
or taking of his property resulting from the obstruction by the
State of surface waters. . . ."90 In another case the court said
that "in construing this provision of the Constitution (Art. 1,
Sec. 17), we have held, along with many other courts, that an
actual physical taking of property is not necessary to entitle its
owner to compensation." 91 Further, "to deprive him of the ordi-
nary benefiia use and enjoyment of his property is, in law,
equivalent to a taking of it, and is as much a 'taking' as though
the property itself were actually appropriated."9 2
Some states have only the restrictive language of the federal
constitution, but Oregon, a state with such language in its con-
85. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
86. Thompson v. Kimball, 165 F2d 677, 681 (8th Cir. 1948).
87. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964) ; Thorn-
burg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
88. 2 NICHOLS, EMiNENT DomAIN § 6.44 (3d ed. 1963).
89. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (1895).
90. Milhous v. State Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 41, 8 S.E.2d 852, 857
(1940).
91. Gasque v. Town of Convay, 194 S.C. 15, 21, 8 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1940).
92. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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stitution,98 has charted a course which in logic and reasoning
is unassailable. Thornburg v. Port of PortZand94 involved an
action of inverse condemnation for flights directly over the
plaintiff's land, which amounted to a nuisance, and for flights
which passed close to, but not directly over, the plaintiff's land
likewise constituting a nuisance. The plaintiff's theory was one
of nuisance, while the defense was that of no trespass and fur-
ther that the flights in question were within the public domain.
The Oregon court first recognized that freedom from noise can
be a legally protected right. The court determined that it must
accept:
[T]he principles of the law of servitude and the validity of
the propositions that a noise can be a nuisance; that a nui-
sance can give rise to an easement; and that a noise coming
straight down from above one's land can ripen into a taking
if it is persistent enough and aggravated enough, then logi-
cally the same kind and degree of interference with the use
and enjoyment of one's land also can be a taking even though
the noise vestor may come from some direction other than
the perpendicular. 5
The Oregon court took direct aim at the Batten case and clearly
showed the fallacy of that decision. The Tohornburg case turned
on the theory of nuisance which could ripen into an easement,
and thereby constitute a taking, and as if to ensure that there
would be no doubt about the position of Oregon on this point, the
court further concluded:
[I]t is a sterile formality to say that the government takes
an easement in private property when it repeatedly sends air-
craft directly over the land at altitudes so low as to render
the land unusable by its owner, but does not take an ease-
ment when it sends aircrafts a few feet to the right or left
of the perpendicular boundaries (thereby rendering the same
land equally unusable). The line on the ground which marks
the landowner's right to deflect surface invaders has no par-
ticular relevance when the invasion is a noise nuisance.
Neither is the 500 foot ceiling relevant, desirable though it
may be as an administrative devise.98
93. OR& CoNsT. art. 1, § 18.
94. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P2d 100 (1962).
95. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 184, 376 P.2d 100, 106
(1962).
96. Id. at 187, 376 P2d at 109.
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The state of Washington has a constitutional provision pro-
viding for both taking and damaging97 In Martin v. Port of
Seattle9" the Washington Supreme Court had before it a group
of plaintiffs who were suffering from direct overflights, a second
group in which there was a dispute as to whether or not there
were any direct overflights and a third group wherein the prop-
erty owners suffered no direct overflights. Recovery was allowed
to those plaintiffs outside the flight path; however, of more sig-
nificance was the court's statement that "substantial injury" had
no place in an action for inverse condemnation but rather comes
to light in the determination of damages.9 9 The court said where
other requirements are present but the injury is such as to be
called "incidental," then "recovery would not be forthcoming.
This is so not because of some arbitrary rule set for convenience
in administration of justice, but because of an inability to prove
damages according to the common and well understood rules of
suit."'-00 Such an approach is more liberal than that of the
Thornburg case, which used the balancing of interest test in con-
junction with the requirement of substantial injury before one
could reach a determination of damages.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals was faced with the typical
problem in Louisville & Jefferson County Air Ed. v. Porter'0 1
where a suit based on the theory of nuisance was instituted for
diminution in market value of homes near the airport. The lower
court awarded damages to the appellee, and the court of appeals
recognized that the non-negligent operation of a business could
give rise to a nuisance. The turning point of the case was the
manner in which the court viewed the evidence, concluding that
"the operations of which the Porters [appellees] complain are
reasonable and for the most part necessary and unavoidable.1 102
The court went further to recognize that the damage to the ap-
pellee had been substantial but said that his annoyance was not
materially different from that which all persons living near a
large airport had endured.10 3 While it may seem that the Ken-
tucky court has disregarded all of the theories generally found
97. WAsr. CoNsT. art. 1, § 16, amend. 9.
98. 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
99. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 315, 391 P2d 540, 546-47
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
100. Ibid.
101. 397 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1965).
102. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd. v. Porter, 397 S.W2d 146, 152
(Ky. 1965).
103. Ibid.
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applicable, it probably can be better explained on the ground
that under the court's view of the evidence, coupled with the
importance of the airport to the community, the appellee did
not adequately bear his burden of proof.
0 4
D. Future Problems
In 1961 it was estimated that more than sixty-five million
take-offs and landings occur each year at airfields in the United
States; 10 5 the figure is undoubtedly larger today and win in-
crease continuously in the future. The introduction of the com-
mercial jetliner into widespread use brought this problem area to
a head in 1958 and the ensuing years. The Federal Aviation
Agency has found that the modern four-engine commercial jet-
liner, after take-off, casts a one hundred decibel overpressure on
land beneath its path of flight to a lateral width of one-half
mile on either side of the path and to a distance of over three
miles from the point of take-off. 0 6 The plight of the subjacent
landowner will enter its next stage with the introduction of the
supersonic jet transport, and to further complicate matters there
is the sonic boom which follows the aircraft while it is above the
speed of sound. Such a sonic boom will travel the breadth of
the land during a New York to San Francisco flight, and its
effects on the subjacent landowner are still open to question and
investigation.
No cases have yet reached the South Carolina Supreme Court.
However, with increased industrialization and the opening of
three jet airports in the state it is only a matter of time before
the court will be presented with the problem. It is hoped that
when the question arises, the court will not adopt the restrictive
view of the majority in Batten but rather will follow the view
of Judge Murrah. 10 7 South Carolina, by court interpretation,
is not hampered as is the federal government in the distinction
between taking and damaging. The property rights of the sub-
jacent landowner should not be violated, and when the scales are
tipped to the side of the landowner's interest and he has shown
substantial interferences, it is to be recommended to the South
Carolina Supreme Court that it permit recovery without restrict-
ing this state to a strict view of trespass.
104. No cases on this topic have reached the South Carolina Supreme Court.
105. Note, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1581 (1961).
106. F.A.A., NoisE ABATEMENT PLANNING Smuxs, No. 3 (1960).
107. See generally Harvey, Landowner's Rights in the Air Age: The Air-
port Dilemma, 56 MEcH. L. REv. 1313, 1317 (1958); 74 HA~v. L. REv. 1581
(1961).
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